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Action-Oriented Predictive Processing 
and Social Cognition
Lisa Quadt
The research field on social cognition currently finds itself confronted with two 
conflicting theoretical camps, cognitivism and enactivism. In their most extreme 
formulations, the former claims that mindreading skills exhaust our social cogni-
tive capacities, while the latter stresses the sufficiency of interaction and embod-
iment. My aim is to find a middle position that provides the basis for discussing 
social cognition as interactive and embodied, while remaining in non-radical ter-
ritory.
This can be achieved by situating social cognition within the framework of 
action-oriented predictive processing (Clark 2013). Specifically, I propose three 
conceptual tools, namely (1) embodied social inference (EmSI), (2) action-orient-
ed predictions (a-o predictions) (Clark 2016), and (3) interactive inference (InI).
The first concept of EmSI refers to the more general term of “embodied infer-
ence” (Friston 2012), which means that an organism’s morphology incorporates 
the demands of its environment. This idea can be applied to the social realm, 
in the sense that the kind of body an individual has constrains the kind of so-
cial interaction they can engage in. While humans, for example, can exploit their 
speech apparatus for communication, ants instead rely on their pheromone sys-
tem. The body of an individual thus also constrains social cognitive skills and can 
be said to play a crucial role for interactions. This becomes obvious when consid-
ering the second concept of “action-oriented predictions”. The basic idea is that 
the job of a predictive model is to distribute the cognitive workload and recruit 
embodied action whenever possible. Here too the body plays an indispensable 
role in that it realizes prediction error minimization by engaging with the external 
world via active inference. Related to this idea is the last concept of ”interactive 
inference”. I claim that interaction plays the same role for social cognition as ac-
tion does for general cognition — namely gathering information about the social 
environment and thus actively sculpting not only one’s external, but also internal 
environment. InI can be described as the minimization of prediction error while 
navigating the social environment. It serves to actively sample proof for predic-
tions or to disambiguate competing models about the other. 
In what I call replicative interactive inference (RInI), the bodily state (e.g., 
posture, movements) of another person is mimicked in order to supplement ex-
teroceptive information about them with interoceptive and proprioceptive infor-
mation. Mimicry, synchronization and automatic imitation are instances of RInI 
that function to make predictions about the other more precise by increasing the 
number of signal sources that yield relevant information. 
Secondly, complementary interactive inference (CInI) refers to changing one’s 
internal or external environment in response to the other person. It serves to 
either regulate the other’s current state (e.g., mothers lowering their body tem-
perature to cool down their infant’s feverish body; Nyqvist et al. 2010), or to 
evoke further behavioral responses that then serve as additional exteroceptive 
input (e.g., using gestures to express one’s uncertainty).
These conceptual tools can serve to alleviate the tension between enactivist 
and cognitivist theories. The present proposal thereby enables a dialogue about 
social cognition as an interactive and embodied process.
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1  Introduction
The topic I will pursue in the current paper concerns the implications that predictive processing (PP; 
Hohwy 2013) has for research on social cognition. More specifically, I will discuss the possibilities that 
action-oriented PP (Clark 2013) holds for beginning to build a comprehensive theoretical framework 
for social cognition. 
The paper is divided into two parts. In the first part I argue that a fresh view on the phenomenon 
is needed because the research field of social cognition currently finds itself confronted with two 
conflicting theories, viz., cognitivism and phenomenology/enactivism (henceforth phenactivism1). 
In their radical2 formulations, the former claims that so-called mindreading skills — i.e., simulation 
(Gallese and Goldman 1998) and theoretical inference (Gopnik and Wellman 1992) — exhaust our 
social cognitive skills. The latter, on the other hand, emphasizes that social cognition entails embod-
ied interaction and even claims that interaction patterns may constitute social cognitive processes 
(De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007). This situation is problematic because both theoretical camps have 
their problems, which leave them unfit for serving as the basis for a comprehensive theory of social 
cognition. Phenactivism, it will be claimed, has neither a sound conceptual nor empirical basis, and 
therefore is unable to provide the means for a theoretical framework in which social cognition can be 
embedded. Cognitivism, on the other hand, neglects the issues of interaction and embodiment almost 
entirely and thus draws an incomplete picture of the manifold phenomenon of social cognition. At 
the same time, however, both theories make valuable positive proposals that should be considered in 
a theory of social cognition. 
In the second part of the paper I argue that what is required to alleviate this tension is a new view 
on social cognition that integrates insights from both sides of the theoretical spectrum while remain-
ing in non-radical territory. Action-oriented PP, as will be described in section 3, provides the con-
ceptual tools to do just that. The term has been introduced by Clark (Clark 2013) to capture the idea 
that PP unifies action, perception and cognition in one theoretical framework. Perception and action 
are thought to follow the same computational principles and to crucially depend on each other in 
their joint mission to minimize prediction error. Where perception generates prior expectations about 
the unfolding of sensory consequences, action functions to fulfill these expectations by sampling the 
world (cf. Friston 2009, p.12). In this scheme, perception cannot do without action, and vice versa. 
Three aspects of action-oriented PP will be discussed in order to later embed them into the context of 
social cognition, viz., embodied inference (Friston 2010), action-oriented predictions (Clark 2016), 
and active inference (Clark 2015b). 
In section 4, I aim to exploit this picture of the mind as drawing both on internal modeling and 
engagement of the environment by embodied agents in order to make it fruitful for research on social 
cognition. I will introduce three conceptual tools that shall provide a conceptual basis for further re-
search. First, the notion of embodied social inference (EmSI) is presented. EmSI is meant to capture 
the idea that the very physiology of an agent constrains their range of social interactions. Secondly, 
the concept of action-oriented predictions is applied to and made fruitful for social cognition. Lastly, 
I introduce the term interactive inference (InI) in order to be able to assign an important role to inter-
active processes for social cognition.
1 Enactivism puts much emphasis not only on the body, but especially on interaction as a potentially constitutive element of social cognition. The dif-
ference between enactive and phenomenological theories seems to boil down to the explanatory scope. While enactivism explicitly claims to offer a 
radically different alternative to cognitivism and thus to build a proper account of cognition (Varela et al. 1993), phenomenology is mostly seen as a 
description of experiential phenomena (Gallagher 2008). I use the word ‘phenactivism’ to describe views that merge phenomenology and enactivism. 
Since they share fundamental premises (Quadt 2015) they can be subsumed under this concept.
2 I use the term radical in the sense of ‘extreme’, not in the sense of “anti-representationalist”. It is important to notice that I will here describe only one 
and a rather radical version of each theoretical strand. Of course, either theory has been presented in various ways and with differing assumptions, 
some more and some less radical. Presenting the multitude of versions of each theory is neither necessary nor within the scope of this paper.
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2  Phenactivism vs. Cognitivism
2.1  Conceptual Clarification
The goal of this section is to lay out the basic claims of phenactivism and cognitivism and to discuss 
their different approaches to general and social cognition. It is claimed that the two accounts can be 
seen as marking the endpoints of a theoretical spectrum, both of them providing valuable insights and 
assumptions about the nature of the human mind. 
I will start with clarifying the concepts of “phenactivism” and “cognitivism”. Both terms refer to 
specific accounts of cognition that hold a distinct set of metaphysical, methodological, and episte-
mological background assumptions. Most readers will be more familiar with cognitivist views on the 
mind, since these have not only been the prevalent accounts since the rise of cognitive science but 
still continue to form the theoretical background of most researchers in the field. My description of 
cognitivism will thus be rather short and my focus will be on disentangling the more obscure and less 
famous notion of what I call phenactivism. Useful definitions of each term are provided by De Bruin 
and Kästner (de Bruin et al. 2012, p. 542-543) and serve to give a first idea of what they amount to:
Classic Cognitivism (COG): The mind is basically an intracranial information processing system 
manipulating (sub-)symbolic representations; cognition essentially is this computational process. 
Enactive Cognition (ENAC): Rather than a representational process, cognition is a process of 
sense-making that emerges from the dynamic online interaction or ‘coupling’ between autono-
mous agents and the environment in which they are embedded. 
In other words, while cognitivism describes the human mind as a computational device that can be 
found exclusively inside the skull of an individual and operates on representations, (ph)enactivism 
claims quite the opposite; the mind is neither inside nor outside the individual but instead emerges 
within the relation of agent and environment. In the following, I will unpack each term further.
2.2  Cognitivism 
Classic or radical cognitivism has been described above as viewing the mind as an entirely internal 
device that operates on representations in a specific, symbolic format. The notion of representations is 
as central as the claim that cognition is skull-bound and computational. This theory is the metaphys-
ical and methodological background for so-called mindreading theories of social cognition. These 
theories are traditionally simulation-theory and theory-theory and in principle describe internal pro-
cesses of a certain kind that underlie the inference of mental states of others. In their most extreme 
formulations, these theories state that social cognitive skills are mindreading skills and thereby draw a 
fundamentally individualistic, internalist, and representationalist picture of the phenomenon. 
The role of social interaction and embodiment in radical cognitivist views is quickly explained. 
Mindreading theories have paid little attention to social interaction and embodiment and how these 
factors could influence, change, or even constitute social cognition. However, it should be noted that 
they are not obliged to deny that both are important factors for social understanding (Overgaard and 
Michael 2013). This is especially obvious from the experimental paradigms that are used to investigate 
mindreading skills. Typically, social stimuli consist of the picture of another person or a video of this 
person executing a specific action (e.g., Iacoboni et al. 2005; Wicker et al. 2003). While this kind of 
experimental design is well controlled, it lacks ecological validity since it situates participants in rather 
unrealistic situations. 
Taken together, radical cognitivist theories foster a rather inflexible view on the mind as an input-out-
put device. This view is then transferred to the social realm, drawing a picture of social cognition that ig-
nores the fact that social encounters involve embodied agents that engage in interactions with each other. 
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2.3  Phenactivism
The shortcomings of cognitivism discussed above motivated phenactivists to find an alternative per-
spective that considers not just the brain in the skull but also the organism in the environment. Phen-
activism describes the mind as relational, as emerging in the interaction of agent and environment. In 
the early 1990s, Varela , Thompson and Rosch (Varela et al. 1993) published their book The Embodied 
Mind in which they aimed to provide a non-cognitivist, alternative model of the mind. Their motiva-
tion was to criticize the view that describes mental processes as computations and the manipulation of 
representations. Such a model is said to be unsatisfactory, since it lacks a pragmatic approach to cog-
nition and fails to integrate an inherent connection between mind and life (cf. Thompson 2010, p. 12). 
A radical cognitivist picture of the mind depicts mental processing as fully internal and will thus 
not attribute any decisive role to the body. Phenactivists, however, adopt a rejection of the distinction 
between inner and outer, claiming that the first mistake to make in thinking of cognition is to assume 
that it has a location which is found either inside or outside the skull (Arnau et al. 2014). This point 
is most crucial for understanding the difference between phenactivism and cognitivism. Even tamer 
versions of cognitivism, which state that the mind can be extended to brain-external structures, are 
still fundamentally different from phenactive views. 
While cognitivism places epistemic mechanisms within the skull and attributes a mere input-role 
to the external world and an output-role to action, phenactivism ties in both of these elements into 
the epistemic process. This is captured by the central notion of sense-making; within their embodied 
activity, agents not only actively regulate their coupling with the environment, they thereby establish 
a perspective onto the world (cf. De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007 p. 488). Agents thus create meaning, 
there is no passive reception of information which is processed into or in virtue of internal represen-
tations which then (potentially) bear meaningful content. 
The centrality of interaction is the core assumption of phenactive accounts and builds the starting 
point for further claims. Social interactions are seen as providing enabling conditions and forming 
constitutive elements for both the development and maintenance of social skills (De Jaegher and Di 
Paolo 2007; De Jaegher et al. 2010; Di Paolo and De Jaegher 2012). In order to expound this view, the 
claim is couched in theoretical terms of general phenactivism. Empirical set-ups, such as the percep-
tual crossing paradigm (Auvray et al. 2009) are assumed to corroborate these theoretical aims. 
At this point it will be helpful to look at how proponents of the theory conceive of interaction. Here 
is a definition that is now generally accepted:
Social interaction is the regulated coupling between at least two autonomous agents, where the 
regulation is aimed at aspects of the coupling itself so that it constitutes an emergent autonomous 
organization in the domain of relational dynamics, without destroying in the process the autonomy 
of the agents involved (though the latter’s scope can be augmented or reduced). (De Jaegher and Di 
Paolo 2007, p. 493) 
In other words, interactions are viewed as building autonomous systems which then are irreducible 
to local mechanisms physically realized within the individuals involved. Two systems are furthermore 
said to be coupled when their behavior and mental states depend on each other. 
The concept of ‘participatory sense-making’ was introduced to capture these ideas. De Jaegher and 
colleagues (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007, p. 497) define the term as “the coordination of intentional 
activity in interaction, whereby individual sense-making processes are affected and new domains of 
social sense-making can be generated that were not available to each individual on her own.” Together 
with the definition of interaction given above, this means that individuals ‘merge’ into one interactive, 
autonomous system. Since sense-making can be seen as the phenactive term for cognition (Thompson 
2010), these claims boil down to the statement that interacting individuals, mutually and in virtue of 
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the emergent interaction dynamics, constitute (at least part of) their social cognitive processes. Social 
cognition as participatory sense-making then exhibits a relational kind of cognition. It is not to be 
located in either individual’s head, brain or even body, but in between interacting individuals. 
In sum, phenactive views on (social) cognition draw a radically different picture than cognitivist 
theories and come with radically different premises. This is problematic for several reasons, which I 
will detail in what follows.
2.4  Problems with Phenactivism and Cognitivism
Both phenactivism and cognitivism — in their radical formulations — are ill-suited for providing a 
comprehensive account on social cognition. The problems that come with a radical cognitivist view 
on social cognition are rather obvious and mostly refer to the fact that they exclude the importance 
of interaction and embodiment. While they are good at accounting for high-level phenomena such as 
explicitly thinking about the causes of another person’s behavior, it is mostly ignored that interactions 
form a context that could change and influence social cognitive processing quite profoundly. If the 
goal is to find a comprehensive theory of social cognition, a theory that excludes the role of embodied 
interaction thus is undesirable.
What about the alternative at the other end of the theoretical spectrum? Obviously, phenactivism 
attributes quite some weight to interaction and embodiment. There is, though, the question of how 
well their claims are backed up, both conceptually and empirically. In what follows, I will discuss the 
conceptual and empirical validity of phenactive accounts and conclude that there are many incoher-
ences and uncertainties which leave them unfit to offer a sound theoretical background for social 
cognition.
To begin with, it appears that phenactivism confuses enabling and constitutive conditions, leaving 
the phenactivist’s claims unclear. A first hint of confusion is found when looking at the taxonomy of 
possible roles of interaction for a social cognitive process X that De Jaegher and colleagues (De Jaegher 
et al. 2010, p. 443) have worked out:
Accordingly, given X, and a particular situation in which X occurs: F is a contextual factor if vari-
ations in F produce variations in X, C is an enabling condition if the absence of C prevents X from 
occurring and P is a constitutive element if P is part of the processes that produce X. 
As Herschbach (Herschbach 2012) points out, however, it is rather unclear what exactly De Jaegher 
and colleagues judge to be a constitutive element. For additionally to the characterization given above, 
they also refer to it as a part of the phenomenon itself: 
A constitutive element is part of the phenomenon (it must be present in the same time frame as the 
phenomenon). The set of all the constitutive elements is the phenomenon itself. The presence of 
these elements is necessary, and therefore also enabling. (De Jaegher et al. 2010, p. 443)
This ambiguity leaves us with two possibilities in which interaction can constitute social cognition: 
(1) it can either be among those processes that produce the phenomenon, but does not have to be a 
part of the phenomenon (e.g., through interacting with her mother, the child learns to ‘read’ emotions 
and can later use this skill outside of interactions when she merely thinks about her mother), or (2) 
interaction constitutes social cognition in the sense that it must be present at the same time as the 
phenomenon and is a necessary part of it (e.g., only when the child interacts with her mother she can 
‘read’ her emotions). 
Claim (1) describes a condition that should count as causally enabling, not constitutive. The idea 
seems to be that interaction enables a particular mechanism to arise in that it was present as a neces-
sary part of the development of that skill, and therefore it should be called constitutive. This confuses 
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the concepts profoundly and boils down to the assertion that interaction is an enabling condition and 
not that it constitutes a phenomenon in the sense that, metaphysically, it is a necessary part of it with-
out which it would not exist. Moreover, the view that being immersed in social interactions — espe-
cially from a developmental perspective — enables particular social cognitive skills can in principle be 
accounted for by any non-phenactive theory that assigns a sufficiently strong role to extra-individual 
and situational contexts. To see this, consider that human newborns are completely helpless without a 
caregiver for an extraordinarily long time. Additionally, given some rather anecdotal evidence of chil-
dren that lacked interactive and emotional engagement in early development and had severe mental 
as well as bodily impairments (e.g., Zimmer 1989; Bick et al. 2015; Fox et al. 2011), the fact that these 
contexts play a necessary role for social cognition seems almost trivial. It is questionable whether any 
theory would reject the assumption that interactive contexts play an enabling role for social cognition. 
Further it should be noted that just because something is present in the same time frame as the 
phenomenon under scrutiny it obviously does not mean that it is part of the phenomenon. Howev-
er, this is how one could read the quotation above. We can thus draw a first conclusion, stating that 
phenactive views lack a solid conceptual taxonomy to back up their strong claims in that it is unclear 
how they identify and separate sets of enabling and constitutive conditions for social cognition. The 
consequence is that they are left with statements that non-phenactive theories can account for as well. 
What is the state of empirical evidence for the claim that interaction constitutes social cognition? 
Auvray et al’s (Auvray et al. 2009) perceptual crossing paradigm is taken as providing an empirical 
ground for the phenactive position on interaction and as such picks up the idea that there might be 
something inherent in the interaction dynamics that is irreducible to individual mechanisms. In the 
experiment, two individuals were blindfolded and had to move their mouse cursor along a line. There 
were three objects that they could encounter on this line; a fixed object, the avatar of the other person, 
and the shadow of the other’s avatar (Figure 1) Whenever they encountered an object, they would 
receive tactile feedback. Their task was then to click whenever they thought to have encountered the 
other’s avatar. The results of the study show two things. First, participants were clearly able to distin-
guish between a fixed and moving object. Secondly, they appeared to favor avatar-avatar encounters, 
which was obvious from the higher number of these meetings. 
Figure 1: The perceptual crossing paradigm: In the perceptual crossing paradigm, two participants control an avatar (dark 
green box) that they can move with a computer mouse along a one-dimensional line with their right hand. The left hand 
rests on a buzzer, which provides the participants with tactile feedback when their avatar encounters an object in this 
one-dimensional space. Attached to their avatar is a mobile lure, or “shadow” (light green box), which follows the avatar at 
a constant, fixed distance. Additionally, there is a fixed, immobile object (blue box) on the line. Participants receive tactile 
feedback when their avatars encounter the other participant’s avatar, their shadow, or the fixed object. The participant’s task 
is to determine when avatars meet; that is, to tell when one participant’s avatar encounters the other participant’s avatar.
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The second finding is said not to be explainable in individual terms and thus to require a non-re-
ductive explanation at the level of collective dynamics. It was found that participants reversed their 
direction of movement after encountering any object, but only when both avatars meet, both receive a 
tactile feedback. The result is that, according to the authors, “this co-dependence of the two perceptual 
activities forms a relatively stable dynamic configuration.” (Auvray and Rohde 2012, p. 3) The fact that 
an avatar-shadow encounter elicits feedback in only one subject is seen as not allowing the emergence 
of a stable interaction pattern. 
There are, however, ways to interpret the results without referring to interaction dynamics as an 
emergent macro-structure whose properties substitute a part of individual mechanisms. There are 
basically three distinct conditions either individual can be in during the task; they can encounter the 
other person’s avatar, this avatar’s shadow, or the fixed object. Each situation differs with respect to 
the type of encounter. Importantly, individuals exhibit different behavioral patterns following each 
encounter. Thus each situation is indeed different, but in virtue of the behavior of either individual. It 
is therefore possible that individuals simply pick up subtle cues in the change of behavior of the other 
avatar, particularly because the situation in which both participants receive a tactile feedback elicits a 
different kind of reaction than the other situations. 
Further, Froese and colleagues (cf. Froese et al. 2014, p. 8) claim that the results of the paradigm 
speak for an extendable mind that outsources parts of the cognitive work into the environment. This 
interpretation is, however, compatible with an extended, yet non-phenactive theory. The same holds 
for the claim that interaction dynamics influence the cognitive process. The ability to discriminate 
moving from fixed objects can easily be explained by perceptual learning, the ability to pick up statis-
tical regularities from the environment. Taken together, it appears that the perceptual crossing para-
digm does not yield evidence that unequivocally speaks for the hypothesis that interaction dynamics 
constitute part of the social cognitive processes that are needed to solve the task. 
The conceptual and empirical uncertainties presented above should therefore leave us reluctant to 
adopt a radical phenactive view and strive to find a less controversial theoretical framework.
2.5  If Radicalism Is the Problem, Action-Oriented Predictive Processing Is the 
Solution
The main problem with radical cognitivism and phenactivism is that they exclude important aspects 
of social cognition, leaving their depiction of the phenomenon incomplete. While cognitivism does 
not take into account the importance of interaction and embodiment, it is questionable how phen-
active views account for ‘representation-hungry’ elements of social understanding, such as explicit 
‘offline’ reasoning about another person. In what follows, I argue that neither radical view can yield a 
comprehensive view on (social) cognition and that a middle-way is needed. 
I previously presented De Bruin and Kästner’s (de Bruin et al. 2012) definitions of cognitivism and 
(ph)enactivism. They examined which of these theories provide the most comprehensive view of cog-
nition and come to the following conclusion:
To conclude our diagnosis: neither COG [classic cognitivism] nor ENAC [enactive cognition] has 
been successful in providing a convincing account of both online and offline forms of cognitive 
processing. It hence seems fruitful to aim at a unified theoretical framework that solves the stale-
mate between ENAC and COG and integrates online and offline processes into a coherent story of 
how cognition can best be understood. (de Bruin et al. 2012, p. 547)
What the authors express in this quotation is twofold. First, it shows that there is a spectrum of theoret-
ical claims, whose ends appear to be classic cognitivism and (ph)enactivism. Secondly, they rightfully 
gather that either account is yet to come up with a comprehensive and coherent account of cognition. 
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The same can be argued for the more specific case of social cognition. Phenactive views have indeed 
brought to awareness important aspects of the phenomenon that were previously ignored. This mainly 
concerns the aspects of embodiment, interaction, and the experiential quality of social encounters. 
Although they have been brought up by traditional phenomenology, they indeed got lost when the 
philosophical debate focused on cognitivist mind reading schemes. I thus agree with proponents of 
the phenactive view that a narrow view on the observational inference of mental states does not reflect 
the manifold nature of social cognition. On the other hand, it is questionable whether phenactive the-
ories are able to capture the whole picture of social cognition. Although they might yield ways to grasp 
interaction, embodiment, and phenomenology, it is unclear how they would account for other aspects 
of the phenomenon, such as offline construction of reasons for another person’s behavior.3
If the goal is to provide a comprehensive theoretical framework for social understanding that in-
cludes — among others — interaction, it is undesirable to adopt any radical position. As matters stand 
now, it seems that both cognitivist and phenactive theories have contributed valuable insights to the 
debate. It could be that some social processes need a rather non-representational, non-computational 
view, while others require a more cognitivist picture. I therefore argue that we should preserve a mid-
dle course and try to prevent any extreme, radical position that potentially excludes important aspects 
of the phenomenon. It would be advisable to attempt to find a theoretical framework that is able to 
integrate the full spectrum of social mechanisms.4 In what follows I suggest that PP yields just the right 
ideas to do so.5 In doing so, I will draw on three notions that are central to PP and, or so I shall ar-
gue, open up the possibility to combine cognitivist and phenactivist theoretical elements. These three 
notions are embodied inference (Friston 2012), action-oriented predictions (Clark 2016), and active 
inference (Friston et al. 2011). I will elaborate on these concepts in the next section, before applying 
them to the phenomenon of social cognition.
3  Action-Oriented Predictive Processing
3.1  Embodied Inference
The notion of ‘embodied inference’ was introduced by Friston and Stephan (Friston and Stephan 2007) 
to express how PP is an instance of the free-energy principle (FEP). To see what this means, we first 
have to consider the situation an embodied organism is embedded in. According to the second law 
of thermodynamics, the entropy of a closed system increases with time. Biological systems, however, 
are considered open systems in that they exchange energy and matter with their environment. They 
thusly resist the second law of thermodynamics and sustain their order. How is that achieved? Friston 
and Stephan (Friston and Stephan 2007, p. 422) suggest that the “premise here is that the environment 
unfolds in a thermodynamically structured and lawful way and biological systems embed these laws 
into their anatomy.” In this sense, we can talk about embodied systems as being models of the envi-
ronment they live in (cf. Friston 2012, pp. 89–90), instead of talking about systems that have or build 
models of the world. This is what Friston (Friston 2012) calls “embodied inference”. More specifically, 
this term expresses that the physiology of a system already presupposes the circumstances it lives in — 
an organism’s phenotype determines its possible state space. 
3 Please note that thus far, the discussion between cognitivism and phenactivism is of an almost fully theoretical nature. This is partly due to the fact 
that most empirical designs available are based upon cognitivist assumptions and that thus far, phenactivists have only introduced few empirical 
designs. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
4 This is not to say that one should or could simply combine phenactivism and cognitivism. Due to some metaphysical incompatibilities, a straightfor-
ward combination of the two does not come easy. For a detailed discussion of this matter, see Quadt 2015. 
5 One possible concern at this point is that PP is built on the conviction that cognition is computation. Since most phenactivists reject such a computa-
tional view of the mind, this could lead to a rejection of PP by proponents of phenactivism. There are two ways to tackle this worry. First it should be 
noted that the aim of this paper is to create a new position that merely integrates ideas from each side of the theoretical spectrum, but does not aspire 
to be fully compatible with both. On the other hand, it could be claimed that phenactivism is not obliged to reject computationalism — a topic that 
needs to be pursued elsewhere. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this concern.
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3.2  Action-Oriented Predictions
The topic of representations is one of the most controversial in the debate between cognitivism and 
phenactivism, which is why the notion of action-oriented predictions is of such high importance. 
While it is almost impossible to imagine cognitivism without the concept of representations, phenac-
tivism rejects it entirely. It will thus be vital for our goal of finding a middle-way to alleviate the ten-
sions revolving around this topic. One compelling solution has been proposed by Clark, who started 
to lay out the concept of ‘action-oriented representations’ in his earlier work (Clark 1997) and contin-
ued to draw a picture of representations that defies the ‘old-school’ version of cognitivism. The concept 
of representation in radical cognitivism refers to (sub-)symbolic vehicles that carry a specific content 
and in this sense are thought to ‘mirror’ the external world. Clark offers several arguments in favor 
of the idea that the kind of representation that PP yields is in no way related to the stiff, passive-mir-
ror-of-nature representation old-fashioned cognitive science talked about. 
First, although internal models are a central part of PP, these models are fundamentally grounded 
in embodiment, in that they “allow a system to combine a real sensorimotor grip on dealing with its 
world with the emergence of higher-level abstractions that (crucially) develop in tandem with that 
grip.” (Clark 2014, p. 242) Representations or internal models are not marooned from brain-external 
matter, they are for engaging the body and world, to elicit action and active navigation of the environ-
ment. At the same time, the concept of representations is not given up. To see how representations in 
this context are defined, allow me to cite Clark’s idea at length:
[…] each PP level (perhaps these correspond to cortical columns — this is an open question) treats 
activity at the level below as if it were sensory data, and learns compressed methods to predict those 
unfolding patterns. This results in a very natural extraction of nested structure in the causes of the 
input signal, as different levels are progressively exposed to different re-codings, and re-re-codings 
of the original sensory information. These re-recodings […] enable us, as agents, to lock us onto 
wordly causes that are ever more recondite, capturing regularities visible only in patterns spread 
over space and time. Patterns such as weather fronts, persons, elections, marriages, promises, and 
soccer games. […] What locks the agent on to these familiar patterns is, however, the whole mut-
li-level processing device (sometimes, it is the whole machine in action). That machine works (if 
PP is correct) because each level is driven to try to find a compressed way to predict activity at the 
level below, all the way out to the sensory peripheries. These nested compressions, discovered and 
annealed in the furnace of action, are what I [...] would like to call “internal representations. (Clark 
2015a, p. 5)
As I read Clark, the essence of his claim is that representations are abstractions of sensory signals. They 
are not the sensory data themselves, but carry information that has been compressed and abstracted, 
enabling a prediction of what the “sensory” data a level below could be. In this sense, it is useful to talk 
about internal models and representations. Predictions represent potential sensory input, becoming 
more and more abstract as one goes up the hierarchy. 
These kinds of representations do not merely generate a picture of the world in our heads. If the 
central role active inference plays in FEP is taken seriously, representations engage the whole agent to 
extract hidden causes in the world. In this sense, Clark opts for talking about ‘action-oriented’-pre-
dictions: “They will represent how things are in a way that, once suitably modulated by the preci-
sion-weighting of prediction error, also prescribes (in virtue of the flows of sensation they predict) 
how to act and respond.” (Clark 2016, p. 133). Considering the role of internal models—to prepare 
systems to act upon their environment and enable them to do so—thus helps us tune the notion of 
representation towards a more embodied, flexible one. This is, in my view, a crucial step towards 
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finding the ‘golden middle’ between cognitivist and enactive theories. The notion of action-oriented 
predictions will also be of high importance for what I call ‘interactive inference’.
3.3  Active Inference
Clark’s interpretation of Friston’s take on FEP entails that organisms strive to reduce free energy by 
opting for the most efficient way to do so. Efficiency, here, refers to finding the strategy that involves 
the least complex route towards prediction error minimization, while bringing the largest effect. The 
brain’s task thus not only entails the construction of inner models, but also preparing an organism for 
its bodily exchange with the environment. This involves the estimation of which channel and which 
‘strategy’ will most efficiently minimize prediction error — will it be better to change my models (per-
ception) or use my body to bring forth a change in the environment (action)? The latter strategy refers 
to what is called ‘active inference’.
The body thus has an indispensable role in action-oriented PP. As described in the previous sec-
tion, the trick is to acknowledge that the task of predictive models (i.e., representations) is to find the 
most efficient, least costly route to success. This is what Clark (Clark 2015a, p. 9) refers to when he 
talks about the “productive laziness” of the brain; whenever the body or the world can be recruited to 
do a job, there is no need to compute complex inner models. Precision-weighting determines whether 
low-level modalities or high-level modeling will ‘be in charge’ to solve the task at hand — depending 
on how efficient the strategy is estimated to be. This strategy will more often than not involve the en-
gagement of brain-external structures:
The task of the generative model […] is to capture the simplest approximation that will support 
the actions required to do the job — this means taking into account whatever work can be done 
by a creature’s morphology, physical actions, and socio-technological surroundings. […] There is 
thus no conflict with work that stresses biological frugality, satisficing, or the ubiquity of simple but 
adequate solutions that make the most of brain, body, and world. (Clark 2015a, p. 291)
Clark here endorses a central aspect of phenactive theories, namely the role of extra-neural structures 
for an agent’s navigation of its environment. Active inference takes center stage in this interpretation 
of PP, in virtue of the fact that the function of predictive models is to distribute the cognitive workload 
and recruit embodied action whenever possible. 
Such a view emphasizes that PP displays a deep and fundamental connection of mind and body. 
This leaves us with the following picture of the (social) mind. PP accounts for quite a spectrum of phe-
nomena; on the one hand, it is a rather brain-bound view, since the generation of predictions and the 
precision weighting process is neurally implemented. In that way, perception is brought forth mainly 
by top-down processing and is determined internally. This side of PP neatly accommodates ‘repre-
sentation-hungry’ processes like imagination, dreaming and also thinking about other people, which 
seem to occur without much brain-external help. To see this, consider that it is argued that the main 
task of the cortex is to generate predictions about incoming stimuli (Friston et al. 2012). This means, 
basically, that the brain is able to reconstruct “the sensory signal using knowledge about interacting 
causes in the world” (Clark 2016, p. 85). Once learned, the system will be able to process without ac-
tual input and thus bring forth imagination, dreams, or explicit theorizing. 
On the other hand, even those more ‘decoupled’ phenomena have been shown to involve the body. 
Saccadic eye-movements, for example, may be the bodily ‘grounds’ for phenomenal experience in 
dream states (Metzinger 2014). In this sense, the body and environment are indispensable parts of 
cognition. It is this neat interplay of internal models, action, and the body that make PP the perfect fit 
for a theory that integrates both phenactive and cognitivist elements, providing a sound ground for a 
theory on social cognition. 
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4  Conceptual Tools
4.1  Embodied Social Inference (EmSI)
The first concept I wish to introduce is ‘embodied social inference’ (EmSI), which emphasizes that the 
physiology of an organism constrains the kinds of social interactions it can engage in. Recall that em-
bodied inference means that the thermodynamical laws of an agent’s environment are ‘folded into’ her 
morphology; that her body is built to keep her alive by resisting the second law of thermodynamics. 
In this sense, it can be said that the agent is a model of its world, because their physiology incorporates 
the physical laws the body needs to obey to ensure survival. This is related to the claim that the phys-
iology of an organism constrains the kind of mind it has, because the laws that are relevant for this 
specific phenotype will be modeled by its body.
In the same way, it can be said that the kind of body an organism has determines the kind of social 
interaction and understanding it is capable of. While a herring strives to stay in its large fish school to 
ensure its survival, cats aim for much smaller groups or may even survive on their own. The human 
body needs a caretaker for an extended amount of time during childhood, not being able to sustain 
itself until a certain age. Further, while humans are able to use their speech-apparatus to communicate 
and interact, ants will have to rely on pheromones to send signals to each other. This can be seen as 
embodied social inference (EmSI); an organism’s phenotype determines the kind of social abilities 
they possess. To be more specific, an embodied organism can be called a model of its social environ-
ment because their physiology incorporates possibilities for interaction; vocal cords make vocal com-
munication possible, for example.
This is also important when discussing the role of similarity for social cognition. While there are 
very many individual differences, the gross anatomy and morphology of individual organisms of one 
species is rather similar. This similarity may provide a fundamental role in the attempt to recognize 
the other as ‘one of us’ and thus to understand them. The role of bodily similarity is twofold; it not 
only determines how well we understand another person, but it also opens up the possibility that there 
needs to be a general similarity for social processing to begin with. The claim that a certain degree 
of similarity is needed in order to understand each other has been famously formulated by a number 
of researchers. For example, Meltzoff (e.g., Meltzoff 2005; Meltzoff 2007; Meltzoff 2013) states in his 
‘like me’ hypothesis that the development of understanding others hinges upon the fact that the infant 
perceives the other as ‘like me’. In fact, it is claimed
that the core sense of similarity to others is not the culmination of social development, but the pre-
condition for it. Without this initial felt connection to others, human social cognition would not 
take the distinctively human form that it does. (Meltzoff 2013, p. 139)
Meltzoff ’s reasoning rests on the assumption that social cognition — especially in developmental 
terms — is enabled by matching visual to motor representations. The bedrock of his argument rests on 
many neonatal imitation studies by him and his colleagues (Meltzoff and Moore 1997). Although hav-
ing no visual information about one’s own face, newborn babies appear to be able to imitate an adult’s 
behavior, such as tongue protrusion (Meltzoff and Moore 1977). It is thought that the visual informa-
tion of the adult is ‘matched’ onto the proprioceptive information the newborn already acquired. This 
matching process then enables imitative behavior. 
The ‘like me’ hypothesis gains additional support when viewed from a PP perspective. In accor-
dance with a simulation model, Friston and Frith (Friston and Frith in press, p. 12) argue that “inter-
nal or generative models used to infer one’s own behaviour can be deployed to infer the beliefs (e.g., 
intentions) of another — provided both parties have sufficiently similar generative models.” In other 
words, similarity here is seen as a presupposition for mental state inference. Only when there is a suffi-
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cient similarity of models, there can also be a big enough overlap which allows the application of one’s 
own models to understand the other’s behavior.6
This is important for several reasons. First, I claim that replicative interactive inference (RInI) 
largely draws on similarity. Secondly, similarity relates to the discussion of so-called ‘shared repre-
sentations’. What Friston and Frith refer to above is exactly this — models or representations that are 
sufficiently similar can be used for both self- and other-related processing. A famous example of social 
mechanisms that rely on shared representations is found in the mirror neuron system. Mirror neurons 
are known to fire not only when an individual executes, but also when she merely observes an action 
(e.g., Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004). They can thus be said to involve shared representations, because 
they function both for action execution (self-related) and action observation (other-related). Finally, 
action-oriented PP implies that representations, i.e., predictive models, are grounded in sensorimotor 
processes. The range of these processes, in turn, are constrained by the kind of body an organism has. 
As trivial as it seems, this basically means that bodies determine the range of (social) experiences one 
can have. Metzinger (Metzinger 2004[2003], pp. 160–161) picks up this point and formulates it as the 
‘single-embodiment constraint’:
Trivially, the causal interaction domain of physical beings is usually centered as well, because the 
sensors and effectors of such beings are usually concentrated within a certain region of physical 
space and are of limited reach. […] This functional constraint is so general and obvious that it is 
frequently ignored: in human beings, and in all conscious systems we currently know, sensory and 
motor systems are physically integrated within the body of a single organism. This singular “em-
bodiment constraint” closely locates all our sensors and effectors in a very small region of physical 
space, simultaneously establishing dense causal coupling.
In making this statement, Metzinger clarifies that the behavioral space of an individual is limited and 
constrained by its body. The range of possible behavior and experiences shape our cognitive process-
ing, an effect whose pervasiveness becomes clear when viewed through the lens of PP. PP depicts the 
neural and cognitive architecture as immensely flexible and ever-changing. If precision-weighting 
admits, any sensory signal can change predictions at any level of the processing hierarchy.
If it is furthermore true that anatomical as well as morphological features are the basis for a system’s 
generative models, and if it is true that these models can only be used for both self- and other-related 
processing if they are sufficiently similar, it follows that the bodies of interacting individuals must be 
sufficiently similar, too. Put differently, if the bodily structure of individuals is grossly different, their 
models may not be sufficiently similar, thus restricting interaction and understanding. The relation to 
EmSI should be clear by now; the phenotype of an individual must exhibit some degree of similarity 
in order to make it possible to recognize others as ‘like me’ and thus to enable the matching of one’s 
own models to the other’s. 
To sum up, EmSI refers to the determining and constricting role that bodies play for social cog-
nition, and also for interaction. In this sense, it can be said that the very physiology of an individual 
determines its space of possible social interactions. 
4.2  Interactive Inference
The notion of interactive inference is tightly related to active inference and can be described as the min-
imization of prediction error by engaging in an embodied interaction. Applying this line of thought to 
the realm of social cognition, I now wish to add that interaction can play the same role for social cog-
nitive processing as action plays for general cognition. This amounts to gathering information about 
6 While similarity is claimed to be crucial for social cognition, please note that it may not be necessary for all kinds of social understanding. Otherwise, 
we would not be able to understand that the dog’s wagging tail is an expression of his excitement or that what the octopus is intending is to open the 
jar. Distinguishing between self and other, thus, is just as important as similarity. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this concern.
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the social environment and in this way actively sculpting one’s external and internal environment. I 
thus claim that just as active inference is central for general cognition, interactive inference (InI), as I 
will call the process, is as central for social cognition. 
What exactly does ‘interactive inference’ mean? Recall that active inference can be described as 
minimizing prediction error in several ways, namely by actively changing an agent’s inner and outer 
environment so to fulfill exteroceptive, proprioceptive and interoceptive predictions, and the disam-
biguation between competing predictive models (cf. Seth 2015, pp. 13–14). In a similar way, interactive 
inference can be described as minimizing prediction error while navigating the social environment. 
Instead of changing one’s model about the other person in order to understand her (perceptual infer-
ence), InI serves to actively sample proof for predictions or to cancel out possible models about causes 
of the behavior or another person. The basic idea is that engaging in interactions with other people can 
be a means to minimize prediction error and thus offers a fast and fruitful way to understand others. 
In what follows, I will elaborate on the concept by further distinguishing two types of InI; replicative 
interactive inference (RInI) and complementary interactive inference (CInI). The distinction serves to 
distill and differentiate the manifold ways in which interaction can enrich and enable social cognitive 
processing.
4.3  Replicative Interactive Inference (RInI)
Turning towards two different types of InI, let us first consider what I will call replicative interactive 
inference (RInI). In RInI, the other’s internal or bodily states are replicated, such as in mimicry, emo-
tional contagion, or automatic imitation. This replication has two effects, both of which can be said 
to make prediction error minimization more efficient. First, it serves to make oneself more similar to 
the other; in other words, to ‘put oneself into’ the other’s bodily state. Instead of generating brand new 
models about the other person and the possible causes of her behavior on the basis of exteroceptive 
social stimuli, it will be quicker to gather information by tuning into their bodily, i.e., interoceptive or 
proprioceptive, state. So far, we have discussed the role of similarity in terms of morphology. However, 
this referred to the basic possibility of understanding each other. RInI can now be said to enhance this 
similarity by replicating the other’s current bodily state. 
Secondly, RInI serves to give ‘first-hand’ information about the other person. In order to get a 
sense of the other, predictions about their current state are corrected in virtue of error signals. When 
replicating the other’s bodily state, these error signals should be more reliable, since they come not 
only from one exteroceptive (e.g. visual) source, but also from an internal source (e.g., proprioceptive 
prediction error). Therefore, during RInI, the bodily state (e.g., posture, movements) of another per-
son is mimicked in order to supplement exteroceptive information about them with interoceptive and 
proprioceptive information. Mimicry, synchronization and automatic imitation are instances of RInI 
that function to make predictions about the other more precise by increasing the number of signal 
sources that yield relevant information.
These phenomena occur automatically and involuntarily — even when people are explicitly asked 
to suppress these tendencies. There are, for example, many studies which show that individuals cannot 
help but synchronize their movements with the other person. This has been shown for several motor 
acts, such as finger tapping (Oullier et al. 2008), rocking in rocking chairs (Richardson et al. 2007) 
and body posture (Lafrance and Broadbent 1976). Chartrand and Lakin (Chartrand and Lakin 2013, 
p. 288) provide a comprehensive review on these effects and summarize them under the notion of ‘the 
Chameleon effect’: “[…] much like chameleons change their color to blend into their surrounding 
environment, humans alter their behavior to blend into their social environment.” In a vast number 
of studies that are reviewed by the authors, it has been shown that mimicry and synchronization are 
accompanied by many facilitating factors and in turn also facilitate social interaction. For example, 
individuals are more likely to mimic another person when there are prior ‘pro-social’ factors, such as 
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in-group effects and prior rapport. Individuals with similar opinions and high empathy rates are more 
prone to mimicry and synchronization. Although there are also inhibitors of mimicry such as the wish 
to disaffiliate with the other person, the authors conclude that unconscious mimicry and synchroniza-
tion seems to be a default for social interactions and occurs even when individuals face other tasks (cf. 
Chartrand and Lakin 2013, p. 290). Further, individuals that were told to keep still and suppress their 
tendency to replicate the other person’s behavior perform worse at emotion detection tasks.
Furthermore, consider the following study conducted by Ainley and colleagues (Ainley et al. 2014) 
that links interoceptive awareness with the tendency to automatically imitate. They found that — con-
trary to their initial prediction — participants who scored higher for interoceptive awareness had a 
greater tendency to imitate. In other words, the more one is aware of one’s interoceptive processing 
(in this study measured with the so-called ‘heartbeat perception task’), the less one is able to inhibit 
automatic imitation. One possible (although rather speculative) interpretation of these results is that 
people with higher interoceptive awareness set the gain on interoceptive prediction errors higher. 
Ainley and colleagues (Ainley et al. 2014, p. 26) hypothesize that 
[g]iven that interoceptive awareness affects perception of the body, it is also likely to modulate ac-
tion representations. It has recently been indicated that in order to avoid mirroring another person’s 
actions it is essential to reduce the precision of proprioceptive prediction error (Friston, Mattout 
& Kilner, 2011). If people with high interoceptive awareness have initially precise proprioceptive 
prediction errors then their tendency to imitate others may be accounted for.
Put differently, in order to inhibit imitation and not to replicate the other’s movement, gain on predic-
tion error must be set low. Thus, weighting the precision of prediction errors high may result in the 
tendency to automatically imitate the other person. If this is correct, the processing steps underlying 
automatic imitation could be the following. First, contextual cues yield information that the current 
incoming signals originate from another person; thus representations about sensory consequences — 
which could be proprioceptive, interoceptive, or exteroceptive — are recruited. Next, depending on 
whether the gain on prediction error is set high or low, the observed state of the other person is repli-
cated or not. As described above, highly precise errors would result in a replication of the other’s state, 
while low-weighted prediction errors would result in the inhibition of automatic imitation. 
This may not only be the case in motor imitation. Phenomena such as emotional contagion or 
the queasiness one feels when observing someone eating something truly disgusting could be cases 
in which gain on interoceptive prediction error is set high. This would lead to the replication of the 
other’s interoceptive state and thus trigger ‘shared bodily experiences’. Entering an actual interaction 
should provide all interacting individuals with more unambiguous cues to which predictive model has 
the highest posterior probability. To see this, recall that RInI serves to make the bodies of interacting 
individuals to be in more similar states. If it is true that higher-order representations are grounded 
in sensorimotor processes, this should also lead to a more similar representational state of the body 
model in both individuals. 
Facial emotion recognition serves as another elaborative example of RInI. Several findings are of 
central importance here. First, it has been claimed that the face is likely the most significant body 
region for social cognition, since it provides the most relevant information when it comes to un-
derstanding others (cf. Farmer et al. 2014, p. 290). Secondly, a great number of studies have shown 
that the sight of emotional expressions leads to activation in brain areas with mirror properties (e.g., 
Wicker et al. 2003). Further, people tend to mimic facial expressions of their interaction partners (cf. 
Chartrand and Lakin 2013, p. 287). Above, I reviewed some of the research suggesting that mimicry 
not only occurs ubiquitously, but that it also has striking effects on social relationships. In turn, there 
is growing evidence that the tendency to mimic is considerably influenced by top-down effects and 
prior information about the other person (ibid.). 
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Putting these findings together, the following picture emerges: Visual signals of the other person’s 
facial expression (plus contextual information) trigger generative models about the underlying emo-
tional state — this is where shared representations enter the picture. These predictive models serve as 
a basis for generating proprioceptive predictions — that is, the motor commands underlying the facial 
expression — and also interoceptive predictions which refer to the internal bodily state the person 
must have been in to give rise to the emotion displayed on their face. Proprioceptive prediction error 
can be quashed by changing the state of facial muscles ourselves, thus mimicking the other person. 
Interoceptive prediction error can also be minimized by actively changing one’s internal environment. 
Seth (Seth 2013) claims that emotions occur when prediction errors are cancelled out for exterocep-
tion, interoception and proprioception, thus disambiguating multimodal models generated in the in-
sular cortex. The same may be true for emotion recognition; multimodal predictive models about the 
cause of incoming exteroceptive signals are confirmed or ruled out by quashing proprioceptive and 
interoceptive prediction error, inferring the most likely cause of the observed emotion. Mimicry, as 
an instance of RInI, is therefore a crucial and fast way to enhance this process of emotion recognition.
The rationale here is that greater bodily similarity will lead to greater social similarity and facilitate 
social understanding. Of course, whether or not interactive inference will be deemed a fruitful way 
to figure out the other person depends on prior beliefs and expectations about the other person. As 
already mentioned, top-down effects are pervasive and determine whether or not mimicry occurs. 
However, this fits nicely in the more general framework of PP, since the multidirectional interplay 
between bottom-up and top-down effects is of central importance. 
4.4  Complementary Interactive Inference
The automatic replication of bodily and motor states is, of course, not the only process which happens 
between individuals during an interaction. Instead of replicating, it will often be necessary to perform 
complementary actions. This second case I will call complementary interactive inference (CInI). CInI 
refers to changing one’s internal (i.e., bodily) or external environment in response to the other person 
without replicating the other’s state. This has several functions. 
First, it can serve to regulate another person’s current bodily or emotional state. This can be achieved 
by changing one’s own posture, movements, or gestures (e.g., giving the other an encouraging nod to 
make her continue talking), but also by altering one’s interoceptive state. An intriguing example of this 
latter case can be found in so-called ‘kangaroo care’, which is often used for prematurely born (human) 
babies. During kangaroo care, mothers hold their infants in an upright position close to their body 
between their breasts and underneath their clothing. It has been found that this has many positive 
effects on both mother and baby. Most interestingly for the matter here are the physiological effects; 
mothers regulate their body temperature according to their infants needs and thereby also enhance 
self-regulation of the child. When the child has a fever, mothers lower their body temperature so to 
provide cooling for their infant. Further, if the baby has an irregular heartbeat, this can be counter-
acted and becomes more steady when their ear is placed on their mother’s chest and they hear the 
mother’s steady heartbeat (Ludington-Hoe et al. 2006; Nyqvist et al. 2010). 
A second function of CInI could be to evoke behavioral response of the other person that serves as 
additional exteroceptive input in order to disambiguate social stimuli. Gestures, facial expressions or 
other movements are used to signal one’s uncertainty and thus provoke a reaction of the other person, 
which then serves as additional information. I might, for example, shrug my shoulders or raise my 
eyebrows in order to signal you that I did not understand what you were saying. This signals to you, 
in turn, that I need additional information and may — if this interaction is successful — elaborate on 
your stance. 
Thirdly, CInI serves to make oneself more predictable, thereby smoothing out social understand-
ing, joint action, or coordination. For joint actions that require coordination, for example, Vesper and 
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colleagues (Vesper et al. 2010) have coined the term ‘coordination smoothers’ to describe the modula-
tion of one’s own behavior in order to make coordination with another person more simple:
One way to facilitate coordination is for an agent to modify her own behavior in such a way as to 
make it easier for others to predict upcoming actions, for example by exaggerating her movements 
or by reducing the variability of her actions. (Vesper et al. 2010, p. 999)
In several studies it has been found that people indeed adjust their movement trajectories, their pace 
or use signaling or communicative actions in order to increase predictability. For example, piano 
players that are performing a duet exaggerate their finger movements or speed up in order to decrease 
variability (Keller et al. 2007). 
What may be the mechanisms underlying all these functions of CInI? Vesper and colleagues claim 
that prediction and motor simulation are key to enabling the execution of complementary actions. 
Simulations are thought to be especially useful for joint actions, where they enhance timing and an-
ticipation of sensory consequences. This comes naturally within a predictive processing framework, 
since it is assumed that predictive models represent sensory consequences of actions in a counterfac-
tual manner (Seth 2014). Assuming that these predictive models can be shared — i.e., that they can 
be used for both self- and other-related processing — it becomes clear how they can be exploited to 
compute not only the consequences of one’s own, but also the other’s sensorimotor trajectory. Inter-
estingly, the role of similarity becomes important one more time, for joint action is enhanced when 
the timing patterns of both agents are predictable. The predictability in turn is dependent upon how 
similar agents are, and how similar their motor experience is. This has been shown in several studies 
that show that mirror neuron activity increases when observing actions that already belong to one’s 
own motor repertoire (Calvo-Merino et al. 2004). The mirror neuron system is therefore involved in 
both replicative action processing and the preparation of complementary actions. According to Pez-
zulo and colleagues (Pezzulo and Dindo 2011, p. 612), “this suggests that the brain can encode actions 
executed by others in an interaction-oriented way, and more broadly that action-perception mappings 
could be quite flexible and task-dependent.” 
Taken together it can thus be hypothesized that shared predictive models are not only useful for 
replicative, but also complementary interactive inference. Interaction is here used to solve problems 
with the other person, in virtue of making oneself more predictable, and using one’s body to signal 
what is needed from the other. Framing interaction within PP allows to attribute an important role to 
interaction patterns between individuals to their social cognitive processing. The mutually unfolding 
predictions, actions, counteractions and perceptions are captioned by interactive inference and thus 
provide a new way to conceptually grasp how interactions matter for social cognition. 
5  Conclusion
The current situation in the research field of social cognition has been depicted as problematic because 
the theoretical schemes of phenactivism and cognitivism alone do not yield a sound ground for a the-
oretical framework on the phenomenon. While the latter ignores the importance of embodied inter-
action, the former has been doubted to have sufficient conceptual and empirical back-up. At the same 
time, both theories account for important aspects of social cognition. The main goal of this paper was 
therefore to find a theoretical approach to combining these aspects, while circumventing the problems 
that come with phenactivism and cognitivism.
Action-oriented PP provides many opportunities for implementing both cognitivist and phenac-
tivist elements in a theory on social cognition. Another aim in this paper was thus to exploit some of 
them and start to suggest ways in which PP can enlighten theoretical work on the phenomenon. Just 
like general cognition, social cognition heavily draws on the interaction of body, mind and world. PP 
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is therefore the perfect partner to highlight this dependency, since it appears that although a great 
part of the prediction error minimization machine is located in the brain, the body and action play an 
indispensable role for this mechanism. To see this, remember that while prediction generation clearly 
is the brain’s job, the minimization of prediction error — the core of PP — heavily engages the body 
and world in virtue of active inference.
In this sense, it has been claimed that embodiment is fundamental to (social) cognition in at least 
two ways. First, the very morphology and phenotype of a system set the baseline of what are probable 
states for it to be in. To capture this idea for the social realm, the notion of embodied social inference 
(EmSI) has been introduced. EmSI expresses that our bodies define the kinds of social interactions we 
are able to engage in, and that a certain amount of morphological similarity is needed in order to en-
able social understanding. Second, as described above, active inference appears as a part of PP it can-
not do without. This has consequences for our view on both general and social cognition. Concerning 
the latter, I coined the term of ‘interactive inference’ (InI) to describe replicative and complementary 
behavior that serves to cancel out prediction error via engagement in social interactions. 
The perspective adopted in this paper has implications for future research. For example, it is assert-
ed that differences in sensorimotor processes result in differences of predictive models, which can be 
shared and exploited for social cognition. From this, we can derive the prediction that large differences 
of sensorimotor processes between individuals will make social cognitive processes that rely on them 
more difficult. This has been shown for the case of autism. Cook (Cook 2016) argues that since the 
kinematics of movements in typical and autistic individuals deviate, they are less likely to resonate 
with each other. This may be one cause not only for the social impairments that come with autism, but 
also for the difficulties that typical individuals have in understanding autistic individuals. From the 
perspective of interactive inference, it can be assumed that processes of replication are disrupted, thus 
leading to an impaired inference process between individuals. It can be hypothesized that predictive 
models that are built on the basis of an individual’s own motor repertoire are too different to support a 
stable inference mechanism. Future research should investigate at which level impairments occur and 
cause impaired social interactions between autistic and neurotypical individuals.
This also relates to the question of how individual differences influence social cognition. This ques-
tion needs to be broken down into several sub-issues and more attention in future research. As de-
scribed before, in the case of autism it has been hypothesized that differences in kinematic profiles 
between individuals with autism and typically developed individuals are one source of problems in 
social understanding (Cook 2016). It has further been shown that similar motor experience of indi-
vidual enhances imitative behavior (Kilner et al. 2007). These findings can serve as a starting point to 
examine how important individual similarity and differences are for social cognitive processing. At 
the neural level, differences in precision weighting could influence the tendency to imitate. This would 
be predicted by the claim that precision optimization is a leading component in automatic imitation.
The considerations in this paper show that although PP puts forth a quite central role of the brain, 
it still integrates a deep sense of embodiment and relation with the environment in virtue of being an 
instance of FEP. As such, this theory displays a fundamental continuity of mind and life. Again, there 
lies a great opportunity to satisfy demands from phenactivism in taking this continuity seriously and 
explore its consequences for a theory of our social minds.
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